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The plaintiffs-appellants file this reply brief in
response to the defendants-respondents' disingenuous attempts to
sustain the judgment below approving a Family Settlement Agreement
pursuant to §§ 75-3-1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code,
The defendants in their attempt to preserve the judgment below:
(1) have switched positions by now claiming court approval of the
FSA was not required; (2) now feel compelled to attack the validity of Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust although the defendants did
not propose and the court did not find the trust was invalid; (3)
assert the lower court properly determined Maxine's claim for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress and properly denied
her a jury trial/ although the lower court never adjudicated her
claim; and (4) repeatedly engage in the miscitation and misleading
citation of record and authority that not only fail to sustain the
defendants* positions but cast a pale over the basic credibility
of their brief.
I.
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE ABANDONED THE FOUNDATION OF THE
LOWER COURTS JUDGMENT — COURT APPROVAL OF THE FSA,
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE FSA IS CONTROLLED BY §§ 1101
AND 1102 NOT § 912, COURT APPROVAL IS REQUIRED TO BIND
-PARTIES AND NONPARTIES" AND AN FSA MATERIALLY ALTERING OR TERMINATING AN INTER VIVOS SPENDTHRIFT TRUST IS
INVALID WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL UNDER §§ 1101 AND 1102.
A.

The Defendants Have Abandoned the Need for Court Approval of
the FSA Pursuant to $$ 1101 and 1102.
The defendants have abandoned the foundation of the lower

court's judgment —

the need for court approval of the Family

Settlement Agreement (FSA) pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code.
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101, 1102.

The foundation of the lower

court's Judgment was the court's approval of the FSA.
at the Judgment and Conclusions of the court.

Simply look

(CR. 1233-1231, CR.

1258-1256).
The reason for the defendants' abandonment is apparent.
The plaintiffs' position both below and in this Court is the FSA
under §§ 1101 and 1102 was not binding prior to court approval and
subject to repudiation.

(App. Br. at 7-8, 39-43).

The plain-

tiffs' position is supported by the plain language of § 1101,
precedent and public policy.
Section 1101 plainly provides: Ha compromise of any
controversy . . . , if approved in a formal proceeding in the
court for that purpose, is binding on the parties thereto, including those unborn, unascertained or who could not be located."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101 (emphasis supplied).

Under the plain

language of § 1101 and the approval structure of § 1102, a FSA is
only binding upon court approval and subject to repudiation prior
to court approval.
Precedent supports the plain language of § 1101 and
uniformly holds settlement agreements subject to court approval
are not binding and are subject to repudiation at any time prior
to court approval.

(See cases cited App. Br. at 40). The

defendants do not dispute this Rule and they have not cited one
case to the contrary.

(Res. Br. at 44-45).

The only argument advanced by the defendants is that
there is no public policy supporting the plain legislative
direction that a Family Settlement Agreement shall only be binding
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upon court approval.

The defendants are wrong.

The defendants

ignore the legislative choice that the desires of the testator
the desires of Mr. Grimm —

are entitled to deference.

—

That

policy is reflected in the Editorial Board Comment to §§ 1101 and
1102.

The Editorial Board Comment states in material part, "The

only reason for approving a scheme of devolution which differs
from that framed by the testator . . . is to prevent dissipation
of the estate in wasteful litigation . . . .

A controversy which

the court may find to be in good faith, as well as the concurrence
of all beneficially interested and competent persons and parent
representatives provide prerequisites which should prevent the
procedure from being abused."

Editorial Board Comment,

§§ 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis supplied).

Tfhe public policy is to

respect the desires of the testator in the absence of the concurrence of his intended beneficiaries and the approval of the
court.

Without the prerequisites, concurrence and approval, the

testator's wishes should control.

Holding that a FSA is not bind-

ing prior to court approval and is subject to repudiation not only
adheres to the plain language of the statute, but supports the
public policy of deferring to the testator's desires without the
concurrence of his intended beneficiariesj
The defendants now take the position that court approval
of the FSA is not required in order to make the FSA a binding
agreement.

(Respondent's Brief (Res. Br.) at 40-47).

The

defendants' new position is that the enforceability of the FSA is
controlled by § 75-3-912 and not §§ 75-3-1101 and 1102.
912 does not require court approval.
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Section

Sections 1101 and 1102 do.

Obviously/ the defendants by changing their position implicitly
acknowledge that if the provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 are controlling and court approval is required, the FSA is not binding
and subject to repudiation prior to court approval.
The defendants have switched statutory horses in the
middle of the stream.

The position the defendants take now is not

the position the defendants took below.

In the lower court the

defendants took the position that court approval of the FSA pursuant to §§ 1101 and 1102 was necessary and the court could
approve the FSA despite plaintiffs' repudiation.
Nos. 8 and 9, CR. 1232-1231).
defendants' position.

(See Conclusions

The district court adopted the

Indeed, the rationale of the lower court's

decision denying the plaintiffs the right to jury trial on the
issues of duress and failure of consideration was the court's view
that the court could determine the validity of the FSA pursuant to
§ 1102.

There is no question that that is what the court did.

The lower court approved the FSA pursuant to §§ 1101 and 1102.
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nos. 70A, 8 and 9,
CR. 1234, 1232, 1231).

Indeed, the defendants concede that in

their brief —

the court "formally approved the FSA pursuant to

§ 75-3-1102."

(Res. Br. 40).

The defendants thus seek to sustain the Judgment of the
lower court approving the FSA on the ground court approval was not
required.

The defendants not only seek to sustain the lower

court's Judgment contrary to their position below, but the lower
court made absolutely no findings and entered no conclusions with
regard to the applicability of § 912.
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B.

The Court Approval Provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 Are Comprehensive and Control The Enforceability of Any FSA Compromising a Claim Relative to an Interest in The Decedent's Estate.
The Need for Court Approval Does Not Turn on a "Partv-Non
Party" Distinction and The UPC Simply Does Not Divide The
Issue of Enforceability of an FSA Compromise Between §§ 1101
gnfl 11Q2 and § 912,
Beyond the defendants volte-face, the dispositive point

is that the defendants are wrong.
§ 912, are controlling.
avail.

Sections 1101 and 1102, not

The defendants' abandonment is of no

Court approval under §§ 1101 and 1102 was necessary to

make this FSA a binding settlement agreement under the Uniform
Probate Code.
Sections 1101 and 1102 mandate court approval and a procedure for court approval for the compromise of all claims relative to any interest in a decedent's estate.

Section 912 author-

izes agreements among competent successors to alter the division
of a decedent's estate.

Section 912, however, is limited to

agreements "to alter the interest, shares, or amounts" to which
the parties are entitled under the decedent's will or the laws of
intestacy.

Section 912, as the Editorial Comment notes, simply

permits those who are entitled to a share in the decedent's estate
to alter the division of the estate among themselves.

If, for

instance, the deceased has left a codicil to a will that is
clearly invalid but evidences an intent by the deceased to alter
the distribution of his estate from his will, his devisees may
agree among themselves to honor the invalid codicil.

That,

indeed, is exactly what happened in the Matter of Estate of Cruse,
710 P.2d 733 (N.M. 1985).

The agreement altering the division of
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the deceased's estate does not have to involve the settlement of
any controversy or any claim.

It may simply involve a redistribu-

tion of the decedent's property among the intended beneficiaries.
A settlement agreement, however, involves more than an agreement
to alter the division of the decedent's estate.

It involves the

settlement of controversies and claims of rights or interests in
the decedent's estate.

It involves an agreement reached in an

adversary setting and generally involves both the release of
claims and a redistribution of the decedent's estate, frequently
to persons who were clearly not the intended beneficiaries of the
decedent.

It is the potential for the abuse of the testator's

desires through the advancement of spurious and malicious claims
that warrants the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102.
Any settlement compromising any claim of right or interest in a decedent's estate is subject to the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102.

Simply, those sections are the pro-

visions of the Uniform Probate Code applicable to the compromise
of claims in a decedent's estate.
—

That is what the statute says

"a compromise of any controversy . . . " ( § 1101) —

"The terms

of the compromise shall be set forth in an agreement in writing
which shall be executed by all competent persons . . . having
beneficial interest or having claims which will or may be affected
by the compromise."

(§ 1102).

This Court indeed has stated that

settlement agreements compromising claims must be approved under
the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102.

In the Matter

of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Sept. 15,
1986).

In Chasel this Court said in part::
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Compromise agreements authorized by Part 11 of the
Probate Code must be approved in formal proceedings . Section 75-3-1101 . . . except for the
requirement of court approval and other statutory
requirements in Part 11 a compromise agreement
under the Probate Code is like other compromise
agreements.1
Id. at 4.
The court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 are thus comprehensive insofar as they apply to the settlement of claims in a
decedent's estate and reflect a policy that before the desires of
the testator are altered based on the settlement of a claim in
which all interested parties concur, a court still must be
satisfied that there was a good faith claim controversy.
Certainly, §§ 1101 and 1102 are not meaningless.
the defendants recognize that.

Even

(Res. Br. at 42). The defendants,

however, in an attempt to take this FSA out of the court approval
requirements of §§ 1101 and 1102 argue that the Uniform Probate
Code divides the issue of enforceability of family settlement
agreements between § 912 and §§ 1101 and 1102.

Literally, the

defendants' position is that family settlement agreements are made
binding under two separate statutory provisions.

The defendants

^J-The defendants' citation In re Estate of Thompson, 601 P.2d
1105 (Kansas 1979) to refute the plaintiffs' hypothetical based on
Chasel — if William Chasel had found the new will prior to court
approval of the settlement agreement, he could have repudiated the
settlement agreement — is a plain misstatement of authority.
Indeed, contrary to the defendants' argument, in Thompson as well
as in Chasel, the court had already approved the family settlement
agreement prior to the discovery of the new will and that is
precisely why the court refused to set aside the settlement
agreement. Id. at 1108 (emphasis supplied),
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contend that family settlement agreements become binding upon
parties to the FSA without court approval under § 912, but that
the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 are necessary
and only necessary to make family settlement agreements binding on
"nonparties"/ such as minors, unascertained heirs and inalienable
interest.

(Res. Br. at 43-47).

The defendants thus take the

position that there is a "party-nonparty" distinction with regard
to the enforcement of family settlement agreements.
The defendants rely on In re Peck's Estate. 34 N.W. 2d
533 (Mich. 1948) to support their "party-nonparty" division of
enforceability between § 912 and §§ 1101 and 1102.

The problem

with the defendants' position is that In re Peck's Estate does not
do that.

Indeed, In re Peck's Estate establishes that the statu-

tory evolution of §§ 1101/ 1102 and 912 of the Uniform Probate
Code provides no basis for the defendants' "party-nonparty"
distinction/ and/ on the contrary/ establishes §§ 1101 and 1102
are controlling.
In In re Peck's Estate, the defendants are correct that
the court did uphold the enforceability of a settlement agreement
that had not been approved by a Probate Court.

The defendants are

correct that the Court held that court approval was not necessary
because there were no minors/ unknown heirs or inalienable interest involved in the settlement.

What the defendants do not point

out to the court and what absolutely distinguishes In re Peck's
Estate is the Michigan statute that was applicable to the In re
Peck's Estate decision.
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The controlling Michigan statute in In re Peck's Estate
provided in material part:
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing
authorities/ competent interested parties may
agree among themselves to alter the interest,
shares, or amounts to which they are entitled
under the will of the decedent or under the laws
of intestacy, in any way that they provide in a
written agreement executed by all who are affected
by its provisions. When there is, or may be, an
interested party to the agreement who is a minor
or incapacitated person or where there is an
inalienable estate or future contingent interest,
after notice to the representative of such person
or interest as provided by supreme court rule, the
probate court having jurisdiction of the matter
may, if the agreement is made in good faith and
gppegrg just gnd reasonable for thg person or
interest, direct the representative of the person
or interest to sign and enter into the agreement.
(See MSA § 27-5191, emphasis supplied).
The reason the court held in In re Peck's Estate there was no
necessity for court approval of a settlement agreement where there
were no minors or inalienable interest is that the plain language
of the statute required that distinction,

the Michigan statute

explicitly limited the need for court approval to settlement
agreements where there were minors, incapacitated persons or
inalienable interests.

Id.

The 1948 Michigan statute controlling In re Peck's Estate
is clearly and materially different from the Uniform Probate
Code.

The Uniform Probate Code was adopted in 1969.

Section 912

of the Uniform Probate Code does have the first sentence of the
Michigan statute but does not have the sentence of that statute
limiting the need for court approval to agreements that affect "a
minor or incapacitated person or where there is an inalienable
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estate . . . .M

The Michigan statute, moreover, did not have

provisions comparable to §§ 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate
Code,

For this purpose §§ 1101 and 1102 expanded the need for

court approval of settlement agreements from settlement agreements
that only affected minors/ incapacitated persons or inalienable
interests to the need for court approval of all settlement
agreements compromising claims relative to an interest in a
decedent's estate before such agreements became binding on parties
and nonparties alike.

This conclusion is established (1) by the

deletion from § 912 of the limited court approval provision of the
Michigan statute; (2) by the addition of two new comprehensive
court approval provisions to the Uniform Probate Code - - §§ 1101
and 1102; and (3) the plain language of § 1101 and the approval
structure of § 1102 that mandate court approval of all settlement
agreements relative to claims in a decedent's estate before such
compromises become binding on "parties and nonparties" alike.
The plain language of § 1101 again supports this conclusion.

The defendants' new position simply ignores the phrase

"is binding on all the parties thereto."
§ 75-3-1101.

Utah Code Ann.

The approval structure of § 1102, moreover, rein-

forces the plain language of § 1101.

Section 1102 requires that

"the terms of the compromise shall be set forth in agreement in
writing which shall be executed by all competent persons . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102.

Section 1102 thus by its approval

structure envisages that settlement agreements, the enforceability
of which are conditioned on court approval pursuant to § 1101/
will be settlement agreements "executed by all competent persons",
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not just settlement agreements pertaining to minors, unborn heirs
or inalienable interests.

In short, the defendants'

"party-nonparty" distinction for the need for court approval
simply defies the evolution, plain language and approval structure
of §§ 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code.
C.

Court Approval of This FSA is Unquestionably Required Because
This FSA Materially Alters and Terminates an Inter Vivos
Spendthrift Trust and Without Court Approval Such an FSA Even
With The Consent of All Beneficiaries Would Be Invalid,
Certainly §§ 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code

are applicable to this Family Settlement Agreement.

(PX. 58-59).

This Family Settlement Agreement not only alters the division of
Mr. Grimm's estate contrary to his desires in favor of Ethel and
Nita and compromises their "claims" and their mother, Juanita
Kegley Grimm's, "claims", but this FSA materially alters and terminates Mr. Grimm's inter vivos spendthrift trust.

(See, App. Br.

at 45-46).
The unchallenged rule is that beneficiaries of a trust
may not materially alter or terminate a trust if such termination or alteration would frustrate a material purpose of the trust
and this rule has uniformly been applied to preclude the material
alteration or termination of a spendthrift trust.
Trusts, § 337.2 and App. Br. at 43-47).

(See 4 Scott on

The consequence of this

rule is that without court approval an FSA materially altering and
terminating a spendthrift trust would be invalid and unenforceable
regardless of repudiation.

(App. Br. at 43-47).

The absurdity of

the defendants' new position is if there is no statutory basis for
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court approval of this FSA —

if this FSA is not subject to court

approval under §§ 1101 and 1102, this FSA would be invalid regardless of the plaintiffs' repudiation simply because it materially
alters and terminates Mr. Grimm's trust.

(Compare PX. 58 and 59

with PX. 11).
The plaintiffs in their opening brief have pointed out to
the Court that there is a substantial body of authority that holds
that even in the context of the Uniform Probate Code, courts will
not approve FSA agreements materially altering or terminating a
spendthrift trust on the ground that to do so would frustrate the
testator's purpose in establishing an inalienable interest for his
intended beneficiaries.

(See cases cited App. Br. at 44-45).

The

plaintiffs in their opening brief acknowledged that the
Restatement has adopted a modified rule.

The Restatement takes

the position that under § 75-3-1101 a court can approve a compromise materially altering or terminating a spendthrift trust if the
court finds it was '•in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries. "

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment O (1959) and

App. Br. at 46.

But clearly court approval is essential and the

only provision giving the court authority to approve an FSA
materially altering or terminating a spendthrift trust is §§ 1101
and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code.

Section 1101 has language

explicitly dealing with the court's power to approve an FSA
materially altering or terminating a spendthrift trust —

M

An

approved compromise is binding even though it may affect a trust
or an inalienable interest."
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The statutory history of § 912# moreover makes it clear
that compromises materially altering or terminating a spendthrift
trust are subject to the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and
1102.

Specifically/ the Michigan statute applicable in In re

Peck's Estate shows on its face that the power with regard to inalienable interest covered by the second sentence of that statute
has been transferred in the Uniform Probate Code to §§ 1101 and
1102.
D.

(See Br. supra, at 9).

The Lower Court Made No Findings With Regard To The Validity
of Mry Grimm's Trust <*nd His Trust« Contrary tQ The
Defendants' Hew Position on Appeal, is Valid,
The defendants in a desperate attempt to wriggle out of

the consequences of the plaintiffs' repudiation of the FSA prior
to court approval, now attempt to rewrite the record below by
claiming Mr. Grimm's inter vivos spendthrift trust was invalid.
(Res. Br. at 52-56).

The defendants in their brief now claim (1)

"The lower court was correct in concluding that the alleged spendthrift trust did not affect the validity of the FSA-/ and (2) Mr.
Grimm's trust was invalid.

(See Point II# Res. Br. at 53-55).

The lower court made no findings and entered no conclusions with regard to the validity of Mr. Grimm's inter vivos
spendthrift trust and made no determination that his trust did not
affect the validity of the Family Settlement Agreement or the
ability of the court to approve it.

(See Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law# CR. 1254-1231).

Indeed/ one of the deficien-

cies of the lower court's judgment that the plaintiffs claimed as
error in their opening brief was "The court made no findings with
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regard to the validity of the trust or its creation.-

(App. Br.

at 66). The court, moreover, made no finding and entered no conclusion that the material alteration and termination of Mr.
Grimm's trust was in the interest of his intended beneficiaries
o
Maxine, Pete and Linda.

—

Simply, in summary, the lower court

made no determination or analysis of any type of the impact of Mr.
Grimm's trust in relationship to the court's approval of the FSA.
Defendants now take the position that Mr. Grimm's trust
was invalid on the grounds (1) it was illusory, (2) it contained
-few- assets, and (3) that under a valid spendthrift trust a beneficiary may only receive income and not the corpus0
53-55).

(Res. Br. at

The defendants further argue that even if the trust is

valid, the plaintiffs have renounced their interest in the trust
and in any event the FSA terminating the trust is in the best
interests of the trust beneficiaries.

The kindest thing to say

about the defendants' position is that they are undeterred either
by the facts, the law or the lower court's failure to make any
findings or conclusions supporting their position.
Mr. Grimm's trust was not illusory or invalid.

Utah has

followed the rules of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts with
regard to issues of validity.

Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d

2

Maxine, Pete and Linda were the primary beneficiaries of
Mr. Grimm's Trust. The LDS Church, however, was a contingent
beneficiary. The LDS Church was not a party to the Family
Settlement Agreement and there was no proof that the LDS Church
had any notice of any petition by the defendants to obtain court
approval of the Family Settlement Agreement. (See PX. 11 at 7).
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181 (Utah 1981)•

This Court has held following the Restatement

that an inter vivos trust is created "when a settlor with the
intent to create a trust transfers property to a trustee in trust
for, or declares that he . . • holds specific property in trust
for, a named beneficiary."

Sundquist v. Sundguist, supra, at 183.

The defendants1 argument that Mr. Grimm's trust is illusory is predicated on the trustor's reservation of a power of revocation.

(See PX. 11 at 11). The defendants rely solely on

Alexander v. Zions Savings Bank & Trust Co., 273 P.2d 173 (Utah
1954), to support their position.

Contrary to the defendants'

position, the rule in Utah and the rule of the Restatement is the
reservation of a power of revocation in the trustor of an inter
vivos trust does not render the trust illusory or invalidate the
trust.

Horn v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 548 P.2d 1265

(Utah 1976); Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §§ 37, 57. The
Alexander case is not in point.
held that it is not in point.
Utah, N.A., supra, at 1266.

Indeed, this Court has explicitly

Horn v. First Security Bank of
If the defendants had felt the need

to call controlling authority contrary to their position to the
Court's attention, they would have pointed out that in the Horn
case in which this Court uneguivocally held the reservation of a
power of revocation does not invalidate aft inter vivos trust, this
Court said with regard to the Alexander case:

"The case does not

stand for the proposition that the reservation by the settlor of
the right of revocation or the right to amend the trust made the
same either testamentary or illusory."
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id. at 1266.

The defendants' second argument attacking the trust is
that Mr. Griram did not transfer any, or at least very many, assets
to his trust.

(Res. Br. at 54). The defendants' position is not

supported by the facts or the lower court's findings.

(See App.

Br. at 15-16; Findings Nos. 14, 16 and 17, CR. 1251-1250).

At the

time Mr. Grimm executed his trust he transferred all of his stock
in Globe Investment Company to the trust.

The transfer of the

Globe Investment stock to his trust was established by a Bill of
Sale attached to the original trust agreement transferring all of
his Globe stock (PX. 11); the stock ledgers of Globe Investment
Company reflecting that transfer and the issuance of a new stock
certificate to Mr. Grimm's Trustee (PX. 12); the new Globe stock
certificate issued and delivered to Mr. Grimm's trustee (PX. 13);
and the uncontradicted testimony of Pete, Maxine and LaVar Tate
that Mr. Grimm signed and delivered the Bill of Sale and stock
certificates in Globe to the trustee, Pete, at the time Mr. Grimm
executed his trust.

(TRA. 45-6, TRB. 441-42, 666-67).

The court's findings do not dispute these facts.

The

court's finding relating to the transfer of the Globe stock is set
forth in Finding No. 14.

(CR. 1251).

One of the misleading

things that the defendants have done is to confuse the transfer of
the Globe stock in July of 1977 and the assignment of other securities that were transferred by Mr. Grimm in August and September
of 1977 when he returned to the Philippines.
54).

(See Res. Br. at

With regard to the transfer of the Globe stock in July the

court found, "The only assets purportedly transferred to the
trustee were the shares of Globe Investment Company".
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(Finding

No. 14, CR. 1251).

M

PurportedlyM is not much of a finding.

It

certainly, however, is not a finding that Mr. Grimm did not transfer the Globe stock to his trust in July of 1977, and the fact
that Mr. Grimm transferred the Globe stock is uncontroverted and,
indeed, unchallenged by the defendants.

The execution of the

trust and the transfer and delivery of the Globe stock would, of
course, alone create a valid inter vivos trust.

Sundguist v.

Sunflqyiist/ supra.
Mr. Grimm also transferred numerous additional assets to
his trust in August and September of 1977 after he returned to the
Philippines.

Each one of the transfers was reflected in a written

assignment signed by Mr. Grimm and notarised by Judge Tiongson.
(PX. 14-55; TRB. 444, 449-450).

Each one of the assignments was

delivered by Mr. Grimm to Pete as trustee of the trust.
450, 448-49; TRA. 52-53).

(TRB.

The evidence that Mr. Grimm executed

each one of the written assignments and delivered each one of the
written assignments to his trustee was uncontroverted.
The lower court in Finding No. 17 (CR. 1250) in part
found:

"It is questionable if the assignments were in fact

properly delivered to the Trustee because PETE testified that he
placed the assignments in his dad's safety deposit box which was
in the name of E. M. Grimm."
a finding.

"Questionable" again is not much of

The finding, however, does not dispute the fact that

the assignments were executed and delivered.

Where Mr. Grimm's

trustee placed the assignments after delivery is of no significance in terms of the transfer of the property covered by the
assignments to the trust.
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The defendants' position that to effect a transfer of
corporate stock to a trust there must be a delivery of the stock
certificate is not supported by the authority the defendants
cite.

(See Res. Br. at 54). The defendants' quotation from

Boaert on Trusts (not "Bogart") cited by the defendant speaks for
itself.

Id.

On the contrary, the cases hold that a transfer of

corporate stock by gift may be effected by a written assignment
and the delivery of the assignment without delivery of the corporate stock certificate.

See, e.g., Kintzinaer v. Millin, 117

N.W.2d 68, 76 (Iowa 1962); Home for Destitute Crippled Children v.
Boomer, 31 N.E.2d 812, 821 (Ill.App. 1941); In re Spain's Estate,
46 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (Sup.Ct. 1944).
is sufficient.

Delivery of the assignment

Id.

In this case that is what Mr. Grimm did.

He executed a

written assignment, he delivered the assignment to his trustee,
Pete, and with regard to the assignments that related to transfers
of corporate stock, he specifically in the assignments referred to
the numbers of the stock certificates and total shares covered by
each assignment.

(See, e.g., PX. 15, 16, 17, 18 & 19). In the

case of Far East Molasses Corporation, for instance, the
assignment related to share certificates Nos. 8, 12, 18, 25, 35,
41 and 48, totalling 31,128 shares.

(PX. 19).

Section 70A-8-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
predecessor provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act do not
change the requirements for the effectuation of an inter vivos
gift of corporate stock.

The courts have held that this provision

of the Commercial Code does not change the common law rule and
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does not require the delivery of the stock certificate.
Kintzinaer v. Millin, supra: Home for Destitute Crippled Children
v. Boomer, supra: Zaharion v. Security National Bank, 290 N.W.2d
84 (Mich.App. 1980).

The courts have interpreted this provision

of the Commercial Code as only dealing with the requirements for
the protection of the corporation/ for instance, in the payment of
dividends:
We have held corporate stock may be transferred,
as between the parties, by written assignment
thereof without manual delivery of the stock
certificates.

. . . although some decisions ar^ to the contrary
by what we think is the weight of authority which
we are persuaded to follow, the rights of the
parties as between themselves are not affected by
the provisions of the Uniform Act. They were
enacted for the protection of the corporation, so
it might safely deal in payment of dividends or
otherwise with the person in whose name the stock
was registered.
Kintzinaer v. Millin, supra, at 75, 76.
In summary, in the case of the Globe stock, Mr. Grimm effectuated
a transfer of stock in Globe not only by Assignment and delivery
of the Bill of Sale but by the issuance and delivery of a new
stock certificate in Globe in the name of the trustee to his
trustee.

The execution of the trust and the transfer of the Globe

stock would, of course, alone create a va^id inter vivos trust
that could not be materially altered or terminated without court
approval, but Mr. Grimm also validly transferred the property
covered by written assignments that were executed and delivered by
him to his trustee.

(PX. 14-55).
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The trpst was valid and the

property that Mr. Grimm intended to transfer to the trust was
properly and validly transferred.
The defendants further argue that Mr. Grimm's trust is
not a valid spendthrift trust because the trustee has the discretion to invade the corpus of the trust for Maxine's maintenance
and support.

The defendants rely solely on the 1931 case Rose v.

Southern Michigan Nat. Bank, 238 N.W. 284 (Mich. 1931), overruled.
In re Edgar Estate, 389 N.W. 2d 696 (Mich. 1986).
reliance on Rose displays a lack of candor.

The defendants'

The shepardization of

Rose discloses the defendants have failed to call to the Court's
attention Preminger v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 220 N.W.2d, 795
(Mich. App. 1974).

Preminger explicitly discusses the Rose

decision and squarely holds contrary to the defendants' position
that a spendthrift trust that grants the trustee the discretionary power to invade the corpus of the trust for the support
and maintenance of the trust beneficiaries is a valid spendthrift
trust.

Id.

In Preminger there was a family settlement agreement

terminating a spendthrift trust that required court approval
before it became a binding FSA.

The spendthrift trust contained a

provision giving the trustee the power in the trustee's discretion
to invade the corpus for the support and maintenance of the trust
beneficiaries.

The proponents of the family settlement agreement

claimed the trust was not a valid spendthrift trust under the Rose
decision because the beneficiaries had more than a gift "only of
income" and the trustee had the discretion to invade the corpus of
the trust for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.

The Court

held that the trust was a valid spendthrift trust regardless of
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the discretion of the trustee and refused to approve the FSA on
the ground that the termination of a valid spendthrift trust would
frustrate a material purpose of the trustor.
Undeterred by their inadequate attacks on the validity of
Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust, the defendants alternately seek to
avoid the consequence of the trust's validity by (1) arguing that
the plaintiffs have renounced their interest in the trust; and (2)
arguing if they haven't renounced their interest in the trust, the
FSA terminating the spendthrift trust can be approved by this
Court as being in the plaintiffs' best interests.
55-59).

(Res. Br. at

It is difficult to keep track of all of the defendants'

arguments to avoid the plaintiffs' repudiation and the need for
court approval of the FSA materially altering and terminating a
spendthrift trust, but the defendants' arguments with regard to
renouncement and best interests of the plaintiffs are some of
their most disingenuous positions.

First, there are absolutely no

findings or conclusions with regard to any renunciation of the
trust or the plaintiffs' "best interests."
conclusions exist.

(CR. 1254-1231).

No such findings or

Beyond that small hurdle,

the plaintiffs never renounced their interest in the trust.
is no evidence of that.

There

The defendants in their brief on the

claim of renunciation cite the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code.

(Res. Br. at 55). What the defendants don't point out to

the Court is that insofar as the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code deal with renunciation, § 75-2-801 requires that renunciation
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be Ha written renunciation.-

Section 75-2-801.

There is, of

course, no exhibit and no evidence of any such written
renunciation.
As far as the FSA being in the plaintiffs* best interests
—

that is hardly so.

How could an FSA derived from perjured

petitions, burglaries and threats be in the plaintiffs best
interests?

But simply in economic terms, the FSA was not in the

plaintiffs' best interests.

Ethel and Nita received over

$1,000,000.00 more under the FSA than their father intended them
to have.

They increased their share from 3.7% of Mr. Grimm's

estate to 25%. Under the FSA, assets Mr. Grimm placed in trust
for the care and maintenance of Maxine were transferred and redistributed to Ethel and Nita.

Under the FSA, Maxine instead of

getting a marital share tax free had her share subject to the payment of taxes and expenses.

(PX. 58 at 8). Finally, Ethel and

Nita under the FSA not only got over six times the amount their
father intended, they received substantially more than Pete and
Linda.
E.

(See App. Br. with citations at 27-28).

The Plaintiffs Were Not Equitably Estopped From Repudiating
The FSA When The Defendants As A Matter of Their Own Choice
Failed to Seek Court Approval For Over Six Years.
The defendants, faced with the clear consequence of their

failure to obtain court approval of the FSA prior to the plaintiffs' repudiation, attempt to throw in the kitchen sink to hold
on to the FSA by resorting to a claim that the plaintiffs were
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equitably estopped from repudiating the FS^.
47-53)•

(Res. Br, at

The answer to the defendants' barnyard equity attack on

the plaintiffs' repudiation is not only that the assertions
supporting the attack are untrue and misleading, but the attack
simply fails to embody the material elements of an equitable
estoppel barring the plaintiffs from repudiation.
The defendants themselves are solely responsible for
their failure to obtain court approval of the FSA.

The first

material element of any equitable estoppel is there must be some
statement or action on which the parties claiming estoppel relied
to their injury.

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602

P.2d 689 (Utah 1979).

The plaintiffs in this case, however, did

not say or do anything to prevent the defendants from seeking
court approval.

David Salisbury was the defendants' witness.

(TRB. 72). Mr. Salisbury unequivocally testified he never did
anything to prevent the defendants from filing the FSA for court
approval.

(TRB. 272). Rex Roberts testified his lawyer, Donald

3

The defendants also rely on court Conclusions Nos. 6 and 7
with regard to waiver and ratification. The court's Conclusions
with regard to waiver and ratification have absolutely nothing to
do with the plaintiffs' right of repudiation. The court's
Conclusions with regard to waiver and ratification, while wholly
conclusory, relate solely to grounds the plaintiffs had to set
aside the FSA "at the time of its execution." (Conclusions Nos. 6
and 7, CR. 1232). Grounds to set aside the FSA at the time of its
execution do not relate to the plaintiffs' right to repudiate the
FSA, which right the plaintiffs had after the execution of the FSA
and prior to court approval. Waiver or ratification would no more
avoid the need for court approval than the execution of the FSA
itself. Consensual acts by the parties simply cannot avoid the
statutory requirement of court approval.
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Holbrook, advised him to file the FSA.

(TRB. 994). The plain-

tiffs simply did nothing to prevent the defendants from obtaining
court approval of the FSA prior to repudiation.

Indeed, any claim

the defendants relied on the plaintiffs in their failure to seek
court approval of the FSA is conclusively contradicted by the
defendants total failure to even attempt to obtain court approval
of the FSA until February 13, 1985, almost five years after the
plaintiffs' clear and unequivoval repudiation and over four years
after this action was commenced.

(See App. Br. at 6-8 with

citations).
The defendants claim the defendants suffered injury by
reason of the defendants' acts in conformity with and reliance on
the FSA is absolutely untrue.

Ethel and Nita have already

received every dime that they were entitled to under Mr. Grimm's
estate plan.

The uncontroverted evidence in this case shows under

Mr. Grimm's estate plan, his two wills and his trust, Ethel and
Nita were to each receive $96,423.00.

(PX. 169B).

In fact, Ethel

and Nita have each received $100,000.00 in cash (TRA. 358, DX.
229), to say nothing about the gold and pearls they retained from
the property and valuables that Ethel and Rex took from Maxine's
home.

(TRB. 936, 937). In short, the FSA did not prejudice

Ethel's and Nita's financial position.
The defendants were not prejudiced from asserting any
claim for more to Mr. Grimm's estate.
fide claims.

(See Br. infra at 38-43).

They did not have any bona
The FSA, however, did not

deter them from asserting any claim regardless of its validity.
The defendants could have asserted any claim to Mr. Grimm's estate
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they wanted to in the lower court.

There was nothing to prevent

the defendants from claiming in the alternative that if the FSA
was subject to repudiation or invalid/ that they were entitled to
a claim for more than Mr. Grimm wanted to give them under his
estate plan.

The defendants could have claimed that Mr. Grimm's

marriage to Maxine was invalid/ that his trust was invalid/ that
he was incompetent or that they were compulsory heirs under the
law of legitime.
did not do so.

They could have made those claims below but they

Clearly# they did not make those claims because

there was no merit to any of them.

But the plaintiffs did not

prevent them from making those claims.

Tl^e FSA did not prejudice

their legal position.
The further claims the defendants make in their brief of
injury by reason of their compliance with the FSA are untrue or
misleading:

(a) The defendants claim they were injured because

under the FSA they agreed to the filing of a Philippine tax return
excluding the Everett Steamship receivable and the Globe stock as
Philippine assets.

The filing of a Philippine tax return did not

prejudice the defendants* interest in Mr. Grimm's estate.
defendants confuse taxation with inheritance.

The

Mr. Grimm did not

distribute all of his personal property under his Philippine
Will.

(Compare PX. 7 with PX. 6). Under Mr. Grimm's Philippine

Will/ Mr. Grimm only gifted his personal property "which is
situated in the Philippine Islands."

(PX. 7). Globe was a U.S.

corporation and its business and stock were located here, not in
the Philippine Islands.

The Everett Steaitiship receivable on the

other hand was situated in the Philippine Islands/ but with regard
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to that asset, the defendants got more than their share.

They

received $100,000.00 each, which was more than they were entitled
to under Mr. Grimm's Philippine Will.
229).

(PX. 169B; TRA. 358; DX.

(b) Certainly, the defendants were not injured by their

payment of a portion of the bribe to the Philippine taxing authorities over Maxine's objection that they arranged, orchestrated and
lied about.

(TRA. 203-208; TRB. 71, 938), The payment of a bribe

is hardly the foundation of an equitable estoppel.

(c) Typical of

the defendants' misleading assertions and citations, is their
complaint Maxine borrowed $500,000.00 from Globe Investment.

The

FSA had nothing to do with her ability to borrow the money from
Globe.

Without the FSA, Globe was an American asset in which

Ethel and Nita had no interest.

But what is misleading is that

the defendants fail to point out —

Maxine paid the money back —

all $500,000.00 of it with interest.

(TRA. 309).

(d)

Finally,

the defendants make repeated references to the benefits that the
plaintiffs received under the FSA.
to those assertions.

There are two simple answers

The first is the plaintiffs never received

anything under the FSA that they were not entitled to under Mr.
Grimm's estate plan, and second, the test for equitable estoppel
is not whether the plaintiffs benefit, but whether the defendants
were injured.
The fundamental answer to the defendants' claim of equitable estoppel is that the plaintiffs never did or said anything to
prevent the defendants from seeking court approval of the FSA and
that the defendants did not, contrary to the claims in their
brief, compromise either their monetary or legal positions by
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reason of the FSA or any conduct of the plaintiffs in conformity
with the FSA.
II.
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THE
DEFENDANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO &150.000 IN
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE FSA ON THE GROUND
THE FSA WAS NOT BINDING PRIOR TO COURT APPROVAL
The lower court correctly rejected the defendants' application for $150/000 in attorneys' fees under the FSA on the ground
the FSA was not binding prior to court approval.
are overly modest in their cross appeal.

The defendants

The defendants fail to

mention the amount of attorneys' fees requested.

The defendants

claimed attorneys' fees in this case in the amount of $149/490.
The defendants claimed attorneys' fees not only for Ethel and Nita
4
but for Rex.
(Aff. R. Brent Stephens, dated 9/6/85).
The only basis for a claim of attorneys' fees by any of
the defendants was the FSA which provided in paragraph 14C for
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "in the event of any legal
action . . . to enforce . . . this agreement."

(PX. 58 at 12).

All of the legal services for which the defendants sought an
attorneys' fee award had been performed, of course, prior to the
lower court's approval of the FSA.

The lower court rejected the

defendants' application on the ground that the defendants could
not seek to enforce the attorneys' fee provision of the FSA prior
to court approval of the FSA.

4

Rex, of course, was not a party to the FSA.
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(PX. 58 and 59).

The lower court was correct in holding the FSA was not
enforceable prior

to court

approval.

Utah Code Ann. §

75-3-1101.

The lower court, however, was fundamentally inconsistent and wrong
in holding the court could approve the FSA despite the plaintiffs*
uncontroverted prior repudiation.

The correct rule dispositive of

both the defendants' cross appeal and the plaintiffs' appeal is
that a settlement agreement, including an FSA, subject to court
approval is not binding and is subject to repudiation prior to
court approval.
III.
THE CO-EXECUTORS OF MR. GRIMM'S PHILIPPINE WILL,
CHARLES PARSONS AND BYRON S. HUIE, WERE "INTERESTED
PERSONS" ENTITLED TO NOTICE PURSUANT TO § 75-3-1102(c)
The defendants concede in their brief that under the
approval structure of § 1102 notice must be given to all
"interested persons."

(Res. Br. at 59). They further concede

that notice was not given to Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie
designated by Mr. Grimm as co-executors of his Philippine Will.
(PX. 7 at 5; see App. Br. at 47-48 with citations).
The defendants claim that Mr, Parsons and Mr. Huie were
not interested persons because Maxine and LaVar Tate were
appointed as supervised personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's
estate by stipulation in the lower court (PR. 58) and that the
Philippine proceeding "was handled as an intestate matter."

(Res.

Br. at 60). The defendants' position is that while they concede
that Mr. Parsons and Mr. Huie were designated by Mr. Grimm as
co-executors in his Philippine Will and that Mr. Parsons and Mr.
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Huie did not receive notice pursuant to § 1102(c), the failure of
such notice is of no consequence because Mr. Parsons and Mr. Huie
were not in fact appointed as personal representatives of Mr.
Grimm's estate.
The defendants' position both ignores the definition of
the Probate Code defining "interested persons" and the circumstances regarding the appointments of supervised personal representatives in the lower court and the Philippine proceedings.
Contrary to the defendants' position, § 75r-l-201(20) specifically
defines "interested persons" to include Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons
—

"It also includes persons having priority for appointment as

personal representative . . . ."
supplied).

75-1-201(20) (emphasis

Persons designated in a will as co-executors are

persons having priority for appointment.

Section 75-3-203. The

definition of "interested persons" under the Uniform Probate Code
thus is not whether in fact someone is appointed as a personal
representative but whether a person has priority to be appointed
as a personal representative, and persons designated by will have
such priority.

The standard, of course, makes great sense in the

context of the approval of a family settlement agreement because
without notice to a person having priority! for appointment, there
would be no opportunity for such person to oppose approval of the
settlement and there would be nothing to bind such person from
proceeding in other jurisdictions —
Japan —

the Philippines, Hong Kong,

with the probate of a testamentary devise inconsistent

with a global settlement agreement.
The circumstances and limitations, moreover, with regard
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to the appointment of the supervised personal representatives
below demonstrate as a practical matter that Mr. Huie and Mr.
Parsons were interested persons.

It is true that Maxine and LaVar

Tate were pursuant to stipulation appointed as supervised personal
representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate in the lower court.
60-57).

(PR.

The order appointing Maxine and Mr. Tate, however,

specifically limited their power with regard to Mr. Grimm's estate
to deal with property located in Utah or in the United States of
America.

The order appointing the supervised personal represent-

atives provided in material part:

" . . . the authority and power

of the supervised personal representatives, E. LaVar Tate and
Maxine Tate Grimm, is limited and restricted to dealing with the
real and personal property of the decedent, Edward Miller Grimm,
which is located in the State of Utah, or in the United States of
America. . . . H

(PR. 58) (emphasis supplied)).

The restriction

on the power of the supervised personal representatives appointed
below precluding them from dealing with any property of the estate
outside of the United States reinforces, as a practical matter,
that persons designated by Mr. Grimm as co-executors of his
Philippine Will were interested persons within § 1102(c).
Certainly the course of the proceedings in the lower court
recognized that Mr. Parsons and Mr. Huie were interested persons
because they indeed did receive notice of the Petition for Probate
and Appointment of Supervised Personal Representatives.

Yet, they

received no notice of the defendants' petition to approve the
FSA.

(PR. 24; App. Br. at 47-48 with citations).
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The defendants' claim that Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons were
not interested persons because the proceedings in the Philippines
were intestate proceedings is outrageous.

The proceedings in the

Philippines were commenced as intestate proceedings because Ethel
filed a perjurious petition that Mr. Grimm had died intestate and
that she was the only resident heir in the Philippines.
and 80; see App. Br. at 18-20 with citations).
cally objected to Ethel's appointment.
with citations).

(PX. 79

Maxine unequivo-

(PX. 88; App. Br. at 20-21

After the execution of the FSA the proceedings

in the Philippines were not conducted as intestate proceedings but
were conducted pursuant to the FSA.

(DX. 214). A proceeding pur-

suant to an FSA cannot be used to deny status as interested
persons to co-executors of a will displaced by an FSA in a § 1102
proceeding to approve the FSA.

That bootstrap rationale would

avoid the very reason for notice to "interested persons" before
court approval of a FSA.
IV.
THE PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
A.

The Plaintiffs Had a Right to Trial By Jury on the Issues of
Duress and Failure of Consideration,
The defendants' arguments to avoid the plaintiffs'

constitutional right to jury trial on the issues of duress and
failure of consideration simply boil down to a contention that the
court could decide those issues first even though those issues
were presented for trial both by the defendants' $10,000/000
counterclaim for breach of the FSA and the plaintiffs' claims to
set aside the FSA.

The defendants contend the lower court avoided
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the plaintiffs' right to jury trial on the issues of duress and
failure of consideration by determining the validity of the FSA
and ordering its enforcement so that the court never had to reach
the defendants' $10,000,000 counterclaim for breach of contract.
(Res. Br. at 62). The defendants are partially correct.

The

court did decide the issue of validity first, including the issues
of duress and failure of consideration.
43, 65, 66, 67 and 69, CR. 1240-1235).

(TRB. 1125; Findings Nos.
But, that is the problem

not the answer.
The validity of the FSA in terms of duress and failure of
consideration was at issue both for purposes of the plaintiffs'
5
claims and the defendants' counterclaim.
When the same issues
are raised both in equitable and legal claims, the constitutional
right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 10 of the Utah
State Constitution requires the legal claims be tried to a jury
first.

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor &

Implement. Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981) ("The Court rejected the
contention that there was no jury right when a claim for damages
was only incidental to the injunctive relief sought, and held that
a jury trial should be accorded the parties on the issues of fact
raised in a legal cause of action when legal relief is sought in
2
conjunction with equitable relief. " Id. at 421). The precise
problem is that the court decided the issues of duress

^Duress and failure of consideration, of course, go to
the question of the validity of the FSA. In the Matter of the
Estate of Frank Chasel, supra, at 421.
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and failure of consideration first.

In doing SO/ the court

violated the plaintiffs' right to trial by jury.
The desperation of the defendants' position is
demonstrated by the defendants' hypothetical.

(Res. Br. at 62).

The defendants postulate "Assume that 'X' sues 'Y' for breach of
contract alleging damages.

'Y' answers by stating the contract is

invalid for a number of reasons.
lawsuit against 'Y'.

'X' decides to dismiss the

'Y' has no right . . . to require the trial

proceed so that he can assert his affirmative defenses."
Br. at 62-63).

(Res.

But, the defendants did not dismiss their

$10/000/000 counterclaim before trial.

They went to trial on that

counterclaim/ putting at issue plaintiffs' affirmative defenses of
duress and failure of consideration.

The right to jury trial is

determined by the claims and issues submitted for trial, not by
the court's decision after trial.
B.

Maxine Was Entitled to a Jury Trial on Her Claim of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
Before turning to the defendants' attempt to avoid

Maxine's right to trial by jury on her claim for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress/ the first point to be made is
that Maxine is entitled to an adjudication of her claim.
There is absolutely no question that the lower court
simply did not adjudicate her claim.

The lower court did not

grant the defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
1121-1127).

(TRB.

The lower court at the close of the evidence simply

stated/ "The court finds the case in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs" (TRB. 1125/ 1121) and that it would
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H

submit a memorandum as to my decision" (TRB. 1125/ 1121).

The

lower court never prepared the memorandum and the findings and
conclusions of the court simply don't mention let alone adjudicate
Maxine's claim for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

On the failure of adjudication alone, Maxine has a

right to a new trial on her claim and that trial by constitutional
right must be a trial by jury.
The defendants attempt to avoid Maxine's right to jury
trial on her claim for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress by arguing (1) Maxine has failed to make out a prima
facie case under Utah law (Res. Br. at 64-68); a party has no
right to jury trial when equitable issues ••predominate" (Res. Br.
at 68-70); (3) Philippine law, not Utah law, is applicable and
that Philippine law does not recognize a claim for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress (Res. Br. at 64); and (4) somehow
Maxine waived her right to trial by jury by not excepting to the
court's ruling at the end of trial finding "in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs."

(Res. Br. at 70).

The defendants first two points do not require further
argument.

The plaintiffs have set forth in detail the overwhelm-

ing evidence supporting Maxinefs claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in their opening brief (App. Br. at
50-51), and defendants' assertion that the test of the right to

6

The defendants concede there was no finding by the
lower court with regard to Maxine's claim for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. (See Res. Br. at 65).
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jury trial is whether equitable claims "predominate" is simply not
the law.

Compare International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer

Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981) with Colman v.
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).
The defendants' arguments with regard to Philippine law
are wholly specious:
1.

The defendants did not prove, cite or do anything

else to establish Philippine law with regard to the intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the lower court and the lower
court, contrary to Rule 44(f), made no findings with regard to
Philippine law.

Rule 44(f), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. ("the law of

such . . . foreign country is to be determined by the court . . .
and included in the findings").
2.

The rule in Utah and the uniform rule is that in the

absence of the proof of foreign law, foreign law is presumed to be
the same as the law of the forum.

Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d 1229

(Utah 1977) ("The rule is that unless the law of a foreign jurisdiction is proved to be otherwise, it will be presumed to be the
same as the law of the forum state."

Id. at 1230); Whitmore

Oxygen Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 196 P.2d 976 (Utah 1948);
Wachs v. Winter, 569 F. Supp. 1438 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
3.

It is by no means clear that Philippine law should

apply since Maxine was in Utah when the Roberts commenced their
campaign of outrageous conduct to coerce M&xine into an FSA.

She

was in Utah when Ethel obtained her appointment as a special
administratrix through a perjurious petition, when Ethel and Rex
broke into her home and took her possessions and when she made a
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written demand that Ethel relinquish her appointment and return
her property,

(See, App. Br. at 18-21 with citations; and see

particularly PX. 79, 80, 82, 84, 85 and 88). The choice of law
rules reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts is that
the law of the place of injury will usually determine whether the
actor's conduct was tortious.

See, Restatement (Second) of

Conflicts, §§ 145, 156.
4.

Most importantly, the defendants' assertion as to

Philippine law according to the authority on which they rely is
wrong.

To establish Philippine law, the defendants rely on J.

Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 513-528 (1973).

(See

Res. Br. at 64). But if the defendants had simply called the
court's attention to the authority they cite, it transparently
does not support their position but supports Maxine's claim.

On

pages 513 and 514 Sangco discusses damages for mental anguish or
suffering.

He states:

Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited
to cases in which there has been a personal
physical injury or where the defendant wilfully,
wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the
mental anguish . . . .
Nor will damages be
generally awarded for mental anguish which is not
accompanied by a physical injury,, at least, where
maliciousness, wantonness or intentional conduct
is not involved. A number of recent cases,
however, have held that damages for mental anguish
will be allowed in a proper case even though not
accompanied by physical injury. Id. at 514
(emphasis supplied).
In short, the authority that the defendants cite supports Maxine's
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress even
under Philippine law and supports Mr. Sangco's conclusion
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••. . . our law on the subject is becoming more and more indistinguishable/ with very few exceptions, from the Anglo-American
tort law."

Id, at 8.

The defendants are not only wrong in their assertions of
Philippine law, they have not relied on the sources for Philippine
law that would establish that law pursuant to Rule 44(f).

Rule

44(f) in a civil code country requires Ha copy of a statute" to
determine foreign law and does not permit the proof of foreign law
solely by secondary sources.

Indeed, this is a classic case for

the admonition of the Advisory Committee to the Utah Rules of
Evidence which has cautioned that in determining foreign law
H

. . . the foreign law of some jurisdictions might best be left

proved through witnesses if resort to sources available in the
State of Utah is questionable."

See Advisory Committee Note to

Rule 201/ Utah Rules of Evidence.

The admonition of the Advisory

Committee is particularly appropriate where the defendants made
absolutely no attempt to establish foreign law in the lower court.
The defendants1 attempt to claim that Maxine waived her
right to jury trial is another kitchen sink effort by the
defendants.

(Res. Br. at 70-71).

There was no such waiver.

plaintiffs filed a timely demand for trial by jury.
873-871).

The

(CR.

A jury was impaneled (TRA. 3) and the plaintiffs

steadfastly maintained their right to jury trial on Maxine's claim
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in argument
both before trial and on the hearing on the defendants' motion for
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directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs' case.

(TR.

Hearings July 26 and 30, 1985 and TRB. 843). At the close of
evidence the court simply ruled in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs (TRB. 1125, 1121) and dismissed the jury.
(TRB. 1125).

The court never gave any reason for its decision,

never produced its promised memorandum and the plaintiffs were not
required to take exception to the court's adverse ruling in order
to preserve Maxine's right to jury trial on her claim for. the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
V.
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ASSERT CLAIMS,
THEY DID NOT HAVE BONA FIDE CLAIMS AND
THE FORBEARANCE OF NONASSERTED MERITLESS CLAIMS, COUPLED WITH OUTRAGEOUS
CONDUCT, DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH CONTROVERSY
The defendants acknowledge that the lower court adopted a
subjective good faith rather than an objective bona fide or
reasonable claim standard in determining whether the forbearance
of claims can constitute adequate consideration for an FSA.

The

plaintiffs' position is that only the forbearance of bona fide or
reasonable claims can constitute adequate consideration.

7

(Compare

At the hearing on the motion for directed verdict at the
close of plaintiffs' case, counsel for the plaintiffs told the
court, "But the one issue I don't want your Honor to overlook in
this case# there is a claim for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. And, your Honor, there is a prima facie
showing" (TRB. 843). Defendants responded in part, "With respect
to the claim for infliction of emotional distress . . . our
position simply is that there is no jury question on that issue."
(TRB. 862).
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App. Br. at 54-64 with Res. Br. at 72-82).

Meritless claims,

claims without merit in fact or law, cannot under the great weight
of authority serve as consideration to justify the alteration of a
testator's estate plan.

The defendants concede that the

plaintiffs have adequately discussed this issue in their opening
brief and no further argument or reply is required.
The defendants, however, do not discuss and do not reply
to other critical arguments of the plaintiffs' addressed to the
failure of consideration.

The defendants do not question or

respond to the uncontroverted fact that the defendants never
asserted any claim for more to Mr. Grimm's estate prior to the
execution of the FSA.

(App. Br. at 61-64 with citations).

plaintiffs' point is three-fold.

The

One is that the defendants' own

testimony, the testimony of Ethel, Rex and their lawyer, Donald
Holbrook, is they never asserted any claim, whether a bona fide
claim or a good faith claim, to Mr. Grimm's estate prior to the
execution of the FSA.

Id.

Second, without the assertion of a

claim, the forbearance of a claim cannot constitute the bargained
for consideration for a FSA.

Id.

Third, without the assertion of

a claim, no logical determination can be made that the defendants
in good faith believed they had a claim to Mr. Grimm's estate or
to put the proposition directly, if the defendants in good faith
believed they had claims to Mr. Grimm's estate, however meritless,
they would have asserted them.
The point is not academic.

Take the defendants' position

that they had a bona fide claim as compulsory heirs under the law
of legitime to Mr. Grimm's estate.
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(Compare App. Br. at 59-61

with Res. Br. at 79-82).

But that claim not only was without

merit# that claim was never asserted.
citations).

(See App. Br. at 61-64 with

That not only is the testimony of Ethel/ Rex and

their lawyer/ Donald Holbrook (Id.), it is reflected in a letter
from Mr. Holbrook.

On April 6# 1978/ Holbrook wrote Rex Roberts

stating in part:
From time to time we have been advised that your
Philippine lawyers have researched the Philippine
laws of succession. As soon as possible, we
would appreciate all the information they can
provide on this subject. (DX. 308).
No information relative to the law of legitime claim was ever
furnished Mr. Holbrook —

none.

But/ more importantly/ by April

6/ 1978/ the basic deal for the division of Mr. Grimm's estate
under the FSA already had been extracted from Maxine by Ethel and
Rex in the Philippines.

(PX. 95/ 92/ 96/ 190; TRB. 236/ 240-42/

245-46/ 915-916/ 642/ 654-55).

If the defendants in good faith

believed Ethel and Nita were compulsory heirs, they would have
furnished Mr. Holbrook with the promised legal research and they
would have asserted the claim.
The defendants not only did not assert any claim for more
to Mr. Grimm's estate prior to the execution of the FSA/ they had
no bona fide claim asserted or unasserted.

The defendants now

raise three possible claims for more to Mr. Grimm's estate —- the
invalidity of his divorce/ the invalidity of his trust and a claim
they were compulsory heirs under the law of legitime.

None of

these claims has any merit/ (see App. Br. at 56-57 with
citations)/ and the lower court did not find that any of these
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claims were meritorious.
1.

(CR. 1254-1231).

The decree of divorce awarded Juanita from Mr. Grimm

after her appearance and trial was not subject to collateral
attack 30 years later.

(See App. Br. at 58 with citations;

Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 31 (1982)).

Under the

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, a judgment whose purpose is to
determine a change in a person's marital status is conclusive upon
the parties to the action and under Nevada law a divorce that is
binding upon the parties may not be contested or attacked by third
persons not parties to the action.

Nevada Revised Statutes,

125.185; Gutowskv v. Gutowsky, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2.

The plaintiffs have previously discussed the

defendants' spurious attacks on the validity of Mr. Grimm's
Trust.

(Br. supra at 13-20).

There was no bona fide claim,

contrary to the defendants' position, that Mr. Grimm's trust was
illusory, that the assets he intended to place in the trust were
not validly transferred, or that under a valid spendthrift trust a
beneficiary may only receive income and not the corpus.
3.

Id..

The defendants had no valid claim that they were

compulsory heirs under the law of legitime.

The issue has nothing

to do with the Philippines accepting the renvoi based on Mr.
Grimm's domicile.

The issue turns on the Philippine law of

succession after accepting the renvoi.

The law of succession in

the Philippines established at trial by the controlling statute
and eminent counsel is that under Article 16 of the Philippine
Code, the children of American citizens domiciled in the
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Philippines are not compulsory heirs•

(See App. Br, at 59-61 with

o

citations).
The failure of the defendants to assert any claim and the
lack of merit to the claims the defendants now assert not only
demonstrates there was no bargained for consideration and no bona
fide claim, these factors also demonstrate that the defendants did
not assert any claim in good faith.

If the defendants' claims

were without merit, if they never did any research to substantiate
a claim, as their lawyer requested, there is no reasonable basis
for any good faith belief in those claims,

You cannot profess

good faith without reason or simply close your eyes to the truth.
If the defendants did not assert their claims, there is further
reason to question their good faith belief in those claims.
Indeed, one of the cutting questions to the defendants' professed
good faith is if they really believed these claims were good faith
claims, why didn't they assert them in the court below?

If they

had any claims for more to Mr. Grimm's estate, why didn't they
plead those claims as alternative claims to the FSA for a greater
participation in Mr. Grimm's estate?

When the failure of the

defendants to assert claims prior to the FSA and the meritless

8

Mr. Angara's telegram to Mr. Salisbury of February 17,
1978, is categorically consistent with Mr. Binavince's testimony
— "Under Philippine law, the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions are regulated by the national law of the decedent,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found . . . ." (DX. 253 at
3007).
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nature of the claims they now assert are coupled with the
defendants' outrageous conduct —

Ethel's perjurious petition and

Ethel's and Rex's break in to Maxine's home —

in securing the

FSA, how can there be any basis for a determination that the
defendants asserted claims in good faith or that this was a
compromise of a good faith controversy as required by the Uniform
Probate Code?

See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102.

People who act in

good faith do not need to resort to that type of conduct.
VI.
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO
RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE
TO THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINQS
The defendants simply have been unable to respond to the
plaintiffs' detailed attack on the inadequacies of the lower
court's findings.
82-83)

(Compare App. Br. at 64-73 with Res. Br. at

The defendants literally do not respond to any of the

substantial and serious challenges to the lower court's findings
raised by the plaintiffs.

(Id.).

These points need to be made

with regard to the defendants' attempt to avoid the serious issues
the plaintiffs have raised with regard to the inadequacy of the
lower court's findings:
1.

The defendants acknowledge that the lower court,

eight months after trial, without any prior articulation of the
grounds or reasons for its decision and even before all of the
evidence had been transcribed, adopted virtually verbatim the
findings and conclusions proposed by the defendants.
82-83).

(Res. Br. at

This practice destroys the foundation for the standard
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deference to the factual determinations below and warrants a full
and fair review of the plaintiffs' carefully documented challenges
to the lower courts findings.
2o

The defendants attempt to dismiss the plaintiffs'

carefully documented Statement of Facts by merely claiming the
lower court resolved conflicts in the evidence against the
plaintiffs.

(See App. Br. at 10-31 and at 64-73).

The defendants

do not point to one single factual assertion in the plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts as unfounded or unsupported by the plaintiffs'
citation to transcript and exhibit.

The plaintiffs in their

opening brief based their Statement of Facts, not on the
plaintiffs' version of the evidence, but on the testimony of the
defendants, the defendants' witnesses and written exhibits.

There

is not a single critical assertion of fact contained in the
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts that is not based on either the
testimony of the defendants, the defendants' witnesses or the
9
written exhibits.
The plaintiffs invite this Court's careful
review of its citations to the record.
3.

The defendants do not respond to the principal

criticism the plaintiffs raise with regard to the lower court's
findings.

The plaintiffs pointed out in their opening brief, "The

principal failure of the lower court's findings is its omissions
or failure to decide subsidiary or subordinate facts that were

defendants' principal witnesses were the defendants
Ethel and Rex Roberts, Donald Holbrook and David Salisbury.
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submitted for its adjudication."

(App. Br. at 65). The

defendants have absolutely no response to the plaintiffs' detailed
attack on the lower court's failure to decide subsidiary or
subordinate facts submitted for its adjudication.

The lower court

cannot discharge its Rule 52 responsibility by simply avoiding the
adjudication of significant controverted factual issues.

(See

App. Br. at 65-73 with citations).
4.

The defendants attempt to create the appearance of

support for the lower court's findings by having their Statement
of Facts purportedly represent an annotation of the lower court's
determinations.

But the critical findings of the lower court are

not supported by the record or by the defendants' citation to the
record.

The plaintiffs will not reargue the numerous inaccuracies

in the court's findings that the plaintiffs have previously
documented.

(See App. Br. at 64-73 and at 10-31 with citations).

Two critical examples/ however, make the point.

Two of the, if

not the two most significant, events leading up to the signing of
the FSA were Ethel's perjurious petition to gain control of her
father's estate in the Philippines and Ethel's and Rex' burglary
of Maxine's home.

Certainly, the defendants' willingness to go to

such lengths to obtain an FSA are significant for the purposes of
determining whether this FSA was a compromise of a good faith
controversy and in assessing the quality of the coercion the
Roberts subjected Maxine to in order to obtain an FSA.

The lower

court's findings relating to Ethel's perjurious petition are set
forth in Finding No. 30 and the lower court's findings with regard
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to the Roberts' burglary of Maxine's home are set forth in Finding
No. 31.

(CR. 1247-46).
(a)

With regard to Ethel's perjurious petition, the

lower court, first, simply abdicated its responsibility and made
absolutely no determination whether the critical verified
assertions of that petition were perjurious.
18-20 and at 67-68 with citations).

(See App. Br. at

The court did find that

Ethel's appointment as Special Administratrix -was in accord with
Mr. Salisbury's recommendation.-

The defendants purport to cite

record support for this finding.

(See Res. Br. at 15). The

defendants' citations lend absolutely no support to this finding.
The finding that Ethel acted on Salisbury's recommendations is as
false as Ethel's petition.
recommendation.

Mr. Salisbury made no such

Mr. Salisbury had not even met Maxine on December

29, 1977 when Ethel filed her perjurious petition.

(See PX. 79,

88, 174; TRB. 223). The fact that Mr. Salisbury had not even met
Maxine, and had absolutely nothing to do with the estate on
December 29, 1977, is supported by the testimony of David
Salisbury and his office records.

(PX. 174; TRB. 223).

(b) With regard to the Roberts' burglary of Maxine's
home, the court determined the Roberts -visited- Maxine's home and
removed her possessions -for safekeeping.burglarized Maxine's home.

The Roberts

Even the lower court found that they

removed Maxine's possessions "without express permission.-

The

findings, however, that the Roberts merely -visited- Maxine's home
and removed property for -safekeeping- are outrageous.

The

Roberts had Maxine's phone number in Utah but never called.
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(TRB.

638).

Maxine's home was guarded in the same manner that it had

been guarded for 30 years.

(TRA. 111-115).

Certainly# the

Roberts had never attempted to Hvisitw Maxine's home and remove
her property while Mr. Grimm was alive.
cleaned out Maxine's home.

(TRB. 20). The Roberts

(TRA. 111-115; TRB. 20-25).

They even

removed a safe that was so big it required 3 men to haul it away.
(TRB. 23-25).

Some HvisitM.

As for "safekeeping", the Roberts

refused to return Maxine's property after written demand, after
she returned to the Philippines, they told her they would not
return her property until she signed an FSA and did not do so.
(PX. 88; TRB. 636-641, 936-937, 1009, 17-25; TRA. 118)
CONCLUSION
The defendants' cross-appeal for attorneys• fees should
be denied and the Judgment of the lower court should be reversed
with instructions in accordance with the questions presented and
the precise relief sought by the plaintiffs-appellants in their
opening brief.
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